The Inflated Importance of the Eastern Front in World War II

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A Refutation of Asier Abardoa’s The Third Reich’s Biggest Mistake

The subject of World War II is one of great importance to white people, since the result of that war is the cause of the situation we are in now.
There has always been talk of what the Third Reich should have done to win the war, and I’m not an exception to speculation and conjuring alternative history regarding this matter (I certainly do it more than most who think about it at all). But the super-majority of alternative history speculations of World War 2, especially about what the Third Reich ought to have done are rather idiotic, short-sighted, and suffer from severe tunnel vision and lack of knowledge of the overall context of the war.
The speculative article by Asier Abadroa is one of the bad examples of the “what Hitler should have done” thought experiment, and the fundamental idea behind his article is just plain wrong, and a rather egregious one to make (though sadly not an uncommon type of mistake).1

The basic idea of Asier’s article is as follows: The Eastern Front is what mattered, everything else was just a minor side-show that didn’t affect the Germans enough to matter in the grand scheme of things.Therefore, the best way to win in the East was to use a “hearts and minds” strategy, as I’m calling it to recruit a large number of Slavs into the Axis forces, and that this would have won the war and that it was anti-Slavic attitudes among parts of German leadership that prevented this. In his own words, he says German anti-Slavic attitudes played a “decisive role” in the German defeat in the East.

Now Asier’s article does come across as a bit of authoritarian fetishism. He mentions the people of the “Western Democracies” being unwilling to fight in the war as hard as the authoritarian Soviets and Germans, and as unwilling to sustain the amount casualties that the Soviet Union suffered in the war.
The article also has somewhat a little bit of a Slavophile fantasy universe flavor to it as he mentions that the Germans could not conquer the vast expanse of “Russia” without the aid of Russian people themselves.

I would have dismissed the idea that authoritarians see “democracies” as weaker and unwilling to suffer in war like authoritarians supposedly would as nothing but a leftist strawman of their particularly disliked enemies, and yet here we are, discussing that very idea. I guess it’s psychologically soothing to believe part of the standard leftist narrative of World War 2 if you have Slavophile tendencies. But I won’t use Asier’s article as a basis for speculating about his genuine overall beliefs and personality, as this could very easily just be a faulty interpretation on my part.

I will refute his thesis from 2 standpoints.
First, the supposed primary importance of the Eastern Front with regard to the result of the war for the Germans. Second, that drawing recruits from the Soviet population to fight the war on the Eastern Front would have been a viable strategy for victory.

The idea that European theatre of World War 2 was decided on the Eastern front, and that the West played a minor and unnecessary role in Germany’s defeat, is a laughably nonsensical fantasy with no relation to reality at all. Practically, it’s almost an inversion of reality cooked up by leftist court historians in the 1960s that just doesn’t want to go away. Why someone ostensibly opposing the left would use such a narrative as the basis for his argument raises some questions.

Firstly, the Eastern Front was always a secondary front for the Wehrmacht from the beginning, the Western Allies were the primary enemy from the start of the war until it’s end. Never in terms of German manpower and industrial allocation was there ever even true parity between the East and West, let alone a superiority in favor of the East. The conflict was meant to be exclusively a war between the European Axis and the Comintern, but British, French, and American involvement threw a metaphorical stick of dynamite into the gears that were Hitler’s war goals.2

Let’s look at the resource allocation.
In June 1941, at the start of Operation Barbarossa, the Germans assigned 3.2 million miltary personnel with 2200 combat aircraft to the Eastern front, out of an overall total of 7.2 million military personnel, with 1200 combat aircraft against the West.
In June 1942, just before Operation Fau Blau, that same number was 2.8 million with 1900 combat aircraft, out 8.2 million, with 2300 such aircaft against the West.
In June 1943, just before Operation Citadel, that number was 3.1 million with 1600 combat aircraft, out of 9.6 million with 2600 such aircraft against the West.
In June 1944, as Operations Overlord and Bagration were starting, it was 2.5 million with 1800 combat aircraft, out of 9 million with 3600 such aircraft against the West.
And in January 1945, it was 1.8 million with 1400 combat aircraft, out of 8.4 million with 3300 such aircraft against the West (though the different air theaters overlapped by this time).3 4

For comparison, the May 1940 invasion of France and the Benelux used up 3.35 million German military personal with 3400 combat aircraft at the start of the campaign. The Battle of Britain involved 2600 German combat aircraft at the start of the operation. The combat aircraft numbers were those active at the fronts at the time and not part of overall storage (I don’t have data for that).
The battles the Lufwaffe waged between mid-1940 to mid-1941 against the RAF prevented significant growth as the German economy wasnt fully mobilized yet, which wouldn’t have been practical more than maybe 6-12 months earlier than they did historically in February 1943.5 6

Additionally, when the 6th Army was encircled in Stalingrad, the majority of the Luftwaffe’s transport aircraft were being used to supply German forces in North Africa in response to Operation Torch.
Without Operation Torch, the 90 thousand Axis troops that surrendered to the Red Army in February 1943 would never have been captured, because the Germans would have had the reserves to stop the Soviets after they overran the positions held by the Romanians and Hungarians.

Additionally, far too many many people focus on raw kill counts. The fact that the Red Army caused 75% of European Axis combat deaths is meaningless.
The majority of German combat fatalities occurred in the last year of the war when the Western allies invaded through Northwestern Europe, which made possible the higher German death toll in the East, as a result of the scale of the fighting, not its lethality.

On a per capita basis, the West was a far more lethal environment for the average German soldier than the East. In 1944, the average Lufwaffe pilot was 7.6 times more likely to die per sortie flying againts the RAF/USAAF compared to the VVS. Since I’m referencing kill counts, the Western Allies were responisble for roughly 75-80% of the Lufwaffe’s combat losses or about 38-40 thousand of the 50 thousand Lufwaffe aircraft irrecoverably lost in combat. The Western Allies and the Soviets each irrecoverably lost 50 thousand aircraft each during the war. Due to a lack of information, I can’t say anything about other European Axis losses. The Western Allies also caused 95-99% of the Kriegsmarine’s irrecoverable ship losses.

Likewise, the Germans never achieved anywhere close to the same kind of K:D ratio against the Western Allies that they regularly achieved against the Soviets. Against the Western Allies, the kill:death ratio was never really above 2:1 in the German favor with even numbers, and only in cases where they could inflict casualties on a retreating army. In contrast, the ratio against the Soviets was 5:1 in favor of the Germans for the war overall (a war that they lost, mind), when they were outnumbered by more than 2 to 1. The K:D ratio against the Soviets was 7:1 when the Germans were winning in 1941-42.

In addition, the RAF/USAAF dropped 1.5 million metric tons of bombs on the Reich itself compared to under 10 thousand for the VSS (and only in the last months of the war). This Allied strategic bombing campaign destroyed the majority of German war production long before it ever reached the frontlines.
Starting in 1943, the Combined Bomber Offensive destroyed or prevented the production of at least 10% of German war production, and at least 30% in 1944.

This undercounts the damage to the war economy that was actually being done, because from the autumn of 1943 onward, the Germans were forced to decentralize and disperse their production which made them produce less than they theoretically could. For example, in January 1944, Bf 109 production was supposed to be 2000 units per month, but thanks to the bombing of the factories and transport infrastructure it was just over 1000.

Estimates for how much potential German war production had been reduced by decentalization and dispersion is in the range between 30-50%. German aircraft and AFV production in 1944 was 35 thousand and 19 thousand units respectively, whereas without allied bombing it would have been 50 thousand and 25 thousand with decentralized production. With centralization the aircraft numbers could have been up 75 thousand (and more balanced between fighters and bombers).

The bombing campaign also destryed the German ability to supply their forces with fuel begginning in May 1944. The German synthetic oil industry accounted for over 6 million tons of petroleum produced, out of a total of 9 million tons from all sources produced in 1943. It was projected to grow to at least 8 million tons out of 11+ million in 1944, but sufficiently large and sustained Anglo-American bombing raids caused the fuel supply to experience a downward crash that would be irrecoverable (among other things).

This is important because the amount of equipment losses suffered from tactical land-based combat (including aircraft) practically almost never exceeded the amount produced at the same time once the major powers had fully mobilzed their economies for war. Therefore, destroying enemy war production at the source by bombing the industrial facilities and transportation infrastructure, and cutting off access to raw materials was what caused the most lasting damage to enemy. Such strategic bombing campaigns required achieving air-naval superiority, which was entirely the work of the Anglo-American militaries throughout World War 2.

The Soviets never had the industry and organizational/combat skill to accomplish a any such kind of feat. The German economy/war industry was twice the size of that of the Soviet Union in 1942. Barbarossa caused a 30 percent loss of industrial capacity for the Soviet Union, but that was compensated for by Lend-Lease supplies of machine tools and factories.7 Lend-Lease also allowed the Soviet industry to focus entirely on weapons, AFVs, and aircraft, leaving their medicine, food, logistics (70% of motor transport and 95% of locomotive transport), and electronics (80 percent of copper) to be handled by the USA. Additionally, about 50% of the Soviet’s steel/aluminium used in guns, small arms, AFVs, and aircraft likewise came from the USA.

Finally, the Third Reich’s most technologically sophisticated, or just costliest individual arms programs such the Type XXI U-boat, the turbojet aircraft (mostly the Me 262), the V-1 cruise missile, the V-2 ballistic missile, the Flak program, and the Atlantic Wall were exclusively used against the West. The flak program itself was one of the costliest in terms of ammunition consumption. In 1944, there were 1.5 million German military personnel manning 50 thousand anti-aircraft guns in the Reich aimed exclusively at countering Anglo-American bombing raids, compared to 20 thousand artillery pieces on the entirety of the Eastern Front.

In summary, the Germans didn’t have more than roughly 30% of their military-industrial power used against the Soviet Union. The supermajority of the Lufwaffe, the entirety of the Kriegsmarine, and from late 1944 onwards the majority of the Heer were fighting the Anglo-American powers.
The proportional industrial capacity for equipping for the Lufwaffe, Heer, and Kriegsmarine were roughly 50%, 20% and 10+% respectively. With the V-weapons program, the ground-based defence of the Reich, and other miscellaneous items taking up the rest. Ammunition allocation for the 3 braches were 60%(includes anti-air weapons defending the Reich), 30% and 10% respectively.

The reason I’m bringing aircraft up the most is because air superiority is one of the key factors in waging modern symmetrical (what others would call conventional) state-on-state war and was absolutely pivotal to the Wehrmacht’s doctrine.
No army has every sustained a successful a symmetrical offensive in the face of hostile air superiority, with perhaps one exception found in Apartheid South Africa’s 1987-1988 intervention in Angola. Even that is not a true exception as poor leadership made the final result much less decisive than it could have been.

Now, why did I bore you with those details and why haven’t I gotten to the rest of the article yet? It’s because I needed to thoroughly show the rather shaky ground Asier’s premise for his alternative history rests upon. That isn’t to say that the Eastern front didn’t matter, but you need a proper perspective to see what it was a part of in the grand scheme of things.

Now, why would recruiting soldiers from the Soviet population (Hiwis) not have helped the Axis? For one thing, the Germans did recruit from the Soviet population early on, they were just used as auxiliaries for occupation duties. About 200 to 300 thousand Hiwis at any one time, to be exact.
They generally weren’t used to fight regular Red army units because they wouldn’t have had the training, equipment, and loyalty to be reliable soldiers against their fellow Soviets. 8

Moreover, the Germans did not have the logistical means to supply and train the majority of them to be effective frontline soldiers. The resource allocation I decribed earlier meant that the Germans couldn’t fully equip their allies, such as for example the Romanians to the same standard as their own units, never mind an extra 1 or 2 million personnel. Such an act would have hamstrung the German logistical system and made actual goal-accomplishing offensives impossible, at least without a larger resource allocation that they had historically.
And if they could do that without losing faster in the West then they would have just gotten an extra million proper German troops with 1000-1500 more combat aircraft and the problem would be solved without having to try anything like what Asier is proposing.

Asier makes the case that the Germans were not kind enough to the occupied population, but he doesn’t provide examples of what it was that made the population hostile after they were supposely greeted as liberators. Now, the Ukrainians and the Balts did genuinely support the Germans and were a base of organic support, but those ethnicities were minorities and not representative of the rest of the Soviet population.

He states that the Germans treated the population poorly until it was too late, but he doesn’t say what the specific actions were. I can only work out via implication that the Germans massacred and extorted too many locals. However massacring/imprisoning occupied population centres that actively supported partisans/insurgents was standard practise for every military in the world at the time.
The classic “hearts and minds” strategy hasn’t been shown to be particularly successful (and it’s not really implemented exactly as most think it is).
In fact, the most successful counter-insugency campaigns by Western powers have more in common with the British efforts in the 2nd Boer War than they do with the American occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of how the enemy population was treated. I see no reason why it would be any different in the Soviet Union.

The partisans did not have any impact on the war in the East. They weren’t accomplishing anything in 1941-42, and they only occasionally caused minor disruption to the Axis forces in 1943-44.9 They just didn’t warrant the resource allocation to require a hearts and minds strategy, one that I don’t believe would have worked outside of Ukraine and the Baltics anyway where the population was either recently occupied by the Soviets (Balts) or treated particularly brutally and murderously by the Soviet government (Ukrainians).

I have yet to see any evidence that the Russian population was generally opposed to, or disliked the Soviet government to the extend that Asier claims they were, certainly not to the extend that the Germans being “nicer” to them than they were historically would have turned them against the Soviet Government enough to overthrow it, not the majority in any case. Those who would do so out of genuine ideology were a small minority, just as the writer and readers of sites like this are a tiny proportion of today’s Western population.

This is the second big hole in Asier’s argument. He doesn’t provide evidence that the Soviet government was hated enough by those it ruled over for them to rise up and overthrow it like he describes in his alternative history strategy. It doesn’t make any sense at all. The Communists were in power for over a generation by the time Hitler ordered Operation Barbarossa to commence. They had successfully destroyed and silenced opposing belief systems, giving them a monopoly on the indoctrination of the people they ruled over. The majority fighting age population had only known life in the Soviet Union as they were maturing and they weren’t going to join the side of foreign invaders against their own friends and relatives. That is just not how most people behave.
Those that joined and aided the Axis were mostly doing so to survive rather than ideological reasons, and were not reliable enough to be trusted with important tasks by the Axis. Those who joined out of genuine ideology were a small minority. Furthermore, most of the aforementioned Hiwis turned on their German “allies” in the latter half of the war when the Soviets began winning. There was no inherent reason for a Russian to fight against all that he knew and had been raised in alongside an invading foreign army that was killing his people.

If the Soviet government was as unpopular as Asier claims, then how were they able to come to power in the first place? How were they able to maintain power and undertake large-scale projects until the 1990s. They weren’t commiting a Holodomor every few years and they weren’t exterminating the entire population and any mass killing that couldn’t be covered up could easily be justified through the official ideology that anyone witnessing was marinated in from their early childhood.

Governments supported by only a small minority, considered illegitimate by the majority of the population which would be liable to turn on the government and join an invading foreign army with a completely opposite belief system exist only in the realm of fantasy. In fact, it’s usually the reverse, that governments have large popular support (or at least indifference) and even if a minority of a country’s population seizes power for themselves they still need to provide the basic survival needs of the majority of the population to stay in power. The Politburo, for all their faults, could provide people with their food, shelter, and clothing necessities so long as they were loyal, and the alternative was GULAG at best and tortured to death at worst.

Just look at the kinds of things the Jewish-Leftist occupied governments of the West get their people to agree to today. The most ridiculous forms of miscegenation, feminism, LGBT politics, destruction of freedom of expression and association for White people who don’t attack their own for defying the neo-bolshevik ideology. Worst of all, the utterly unprecedented act flooding previously 80-100% White countries with infinity browns and the suppression of those who even speak up about it, to say nothing of those who actively fight against it.10

They don’t even have to ban elections, as controlled opposition herds people to harmless positions if they don’t buy into the regimes’ latest excesses anyway. The Soviet Union’s belief system was just a worse version of what we have today. People will conform to and adopt the belief system of those who rule them and who they think represents their interests.

In short, there would have had to be a decommunization program for all of the Soviet population under Axis control, which would have taken a few years to finish. The Axis would have needed to defeat the Soviet Union conventionally and end the war before such a program could begin, otherwise the soviet population would have mostly resisted in the hopes that the Red Army would “liberate” them, as they would see it.

What’s interesting is that Asier unintentionally provides a bit of evidence against his idea by he acknowledges that many of the Russian Nationalists that the Germans initially worked with were Tsarist imperialists that wanted to restore and expand the Russian Empire, something which would have been opposed by the other Soviet nationalities. A big problem the Germans ran into is that many of their anti-communist allies in Eastern europe also disliked and couldn’t get along with each, with their anti-communism being the only meaningful thing they could have in common with each other.
I will, however, acknowledge that the Germans did improperly utilize Stepan Bandera’s OUN-UPA and the Ukrainians to an extent. 11

Before finishing, I’ll provide an alternative to Asier’s strategy as it’s easy to criticize but it’s only fair to present an alternative.
Without just magicking an extra million German troops with the appropriate air and logistical support, or just having Western powers not partake in the war, here is what Hitler should have done:

He should have focused on seizing Ukraine and Caucasus regions from the Soviet Union at the start of the campaign, as those areas together contained 60% of Soviet food production, 70% of the Soviet Union’s iron/coal, and 85 percent of its oil production. If this were not possible in 1941, then he shouldn’t have split his offensive forces by trying to take Stalingrad and the Caucuses simultaneously with most of the troops getting stuck in the latter location.
Send them all to capture Stalingrad as Hitler himself originally planned but later changed his mind, then capture territory on the Western bank of the Volga south of Stalingrad to the Caspian sea. While it’d have been preferable to hold all of the Caucasus all the way to the mountains of the same name, cutting them off from the Soviets by capturing Astrakhan and the mouth of the Volga would have mostly had the same effect. 12

With proper planning both Operations Mars and Uranus would have failed (instead of just operation Mars). With Ukraine and the Caucasus in German hands, along with territory the Germans historically captured, the Soviets would have been deprived of half their pre-invasion population (180 million). Thus, with some pressure Stallin would have been forced into a second Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and the Soviets would have been knocked out of the war in 1943. 13

This would have allowed the Germans to downsize their army and free up 2 million personnel. At least half would have gone to the Lufwaffe and related industries and the Germans would have built up the means to effectively defend against Anglo-American airpower. I don’t believe Churchill and Rossevelt would have agreed to peace. They and their Jewish backers were determined to destroy an independent nationalist Germany at whatever cost so the war would have continued into 1945, at least until Roosevelt’s death. It is possible that at that point, Churchill would have slowly changed his mind (and possibly lost the election), and leaders who would have been willing to reason with Hitler agreed to end the war in exchange for German withdrawal from Western Europe.

It would have been very difficult as the Anglo-American allies had 2 times the population and 2.5+ times the industry as Germany, but with geography and the right strategy the Germans could have had the Luftwaffe match the combined size of the RAF/USAAF, as they had the industry to do it. That would have made an invasion of Germany infeasible, though the Allies might still have been able to retake France, obviously much more slowly than historically. However, it’d be unlikely they’d able to take the offensive into Germany itself in this timeline.

In conclusion, much can be said about what Hitler should have done to win his war, but the majority of the alternative proposed decisions are wrong, and the last thing we need to do is to add more fantasy to a topic already drowning in TV/Youtube/Bad Book-brained stupidity.

Further reading:
The books How The War Was Won, the Russo-German War, the USSBS reports, and the Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy can be read for free on
If you only have time for one book read chapters 1-2, 8-9, and 11 of How the War Was Won.
That should give you the most details pertinent to the point I made.

For further reading into the disparities in combat power between American, British, German, and Soviet soldiers, read the book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat by Christopher A. Lawrence.
And here is the wesbsite he writes for

Do keep in mind that the ideologies of the authors of these books are post-1945 Left-Liberal so there is libtard cringe (you’ll know when you see it), but it’s rare and doesn’t interfere with the points made, and is likely just there to placate the Jews and leftists in academia.

As for what I said about ideological conformity, I would recommend going to and looking at William Pierce’s discussions and writings on the subject.
Especially the “lemming” stuff.

  1. ↩︎
  2. See “How The War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied victory in World War II” ↩︎
  3. See ↩︎
  4. See ↩︎
  5. See the Omnipresent Lufwaffe by Nigel Askey at ↩︎
  6. See ↩︎
  7. See this discussion I found convincing ↩︎
  8. See ‘The Nazi War Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944’ by Matthew Cooper ↩︎
  9. See “Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare” by Jacqueline L. Hazelton. ↩︎
  10. See ↩︎
  11. See ↩︎
  12. See Stalin’s Order No 227 on the importance of Caucasus for the Soviets ↩︎
  13. See The Russo-German War 1941-45 by Albert Seaton ↩︎

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