Champions of Judea | Part 1

Loading word count...
Listen to this article
This entry is part 4 of 6 in the Britain and her Jews

Our last article discussed the pursuit of Jewish interests by Winston Churchill and the British ruling class. Recall that Churchill considered Jews (at least as compared to Arabs) to be racially superior and strove energetically to enable Jewish colonisation of Manchester and London as well as of Palestine. He was born in the ambit of Rothschild, de Hirsch and Cassel, and was unfailingly loyal to Zionists throughout his life, serving them with outstanding fervour. He helped bring about the Balfour Declaration. He repeated Disraeli’s dictum “The Lord deals with the nations as the nations deal with the Jews”, claiming the sanction of the Christian deity for Jewish supremacism. Churchill described his devotion to Zionism bluntly as “a question of which civilisation you prefer.”

Churchill’s anti-German beliefs were as old as his adoration of what he called the “higher grade race”. He helped cause the Great War and was thrilled by it. After Versailles, he traduced Weimar governments less frequently than he had those of the German Empire, but on occasions in the 1920s still spoke of Germany as a threat.1 On March 23rd 1933, two months after Adolf Hitler became chancellor, Churchill castigated the new Germany in Parliament for its “ferocity and war spirit, the pitiless ill-treatment of minorities [and] the denial of the normal protections of civilised society to large numbers of individuals solely on the ground of race”.2 He asserted that “The Nazis inculcate a form of blood lust in their children… without parallel… since barbarian and pagan times.”3

Portraying Germany as a military threat was, at that time, partly just a way for an unprincipled politician to attack Ramsay MacDonald, the prime minister who, though sympathetic to the Soviets, was for disarmament to facilitate peace.4 Churchill, though, was unprincipled in a consistently anti-German direction. Had he ‘warned’ about Stalin the way he did about Hitler, Churchill’s post-war reputation as the politician who ‘saw the danger’ could have been twice as great. He had been staunchly anti-communist since 1917, and until 1930 or later, “His posture toward the Soviet Union was one of consistent abhorrence.”5 Yet as the Soviet Union proceeded to amass the largest armed forces in history, Churchill does not appear to have investigated the red threat at all.6 By 1935 he was scheming with the Soviet ambassador against the British government. By the summer of 1940 he had condoned the Soviet annexation of several countries. The Soviet regime, without war as extenuation, had by 1935 already caused civilian ruin and death on a scale Hitler’s regime would never match, with immense horrors still to be inflicted. Evidently neither Churchill nor anyone else lauded for their prescience in regard to Germany had any sincere objection to dictatorships that callously maltreated civilians and used vast forces to menace their neighbours, and any historical work implying that they did must be false and exculpatory.

Jewish foreign policy

As though at the same prompting, Churchill began to campaign against Germany simultaneously with an international alliance of Jewish interests organised and led publicly by Samuel Untermyer, a wealthy Jewish lawyer from the USA. Untermyer launched a boycott which the Daily Express referred to on March 24th 1933 as a ‘Judean declaration of war against Germany’.7 ‘War’ was scarcely an exaggeration, as Zbyněk Vydra describes: “The main goal was terminating Jewish persecution by overthrowing Hitler and the boycott was meant to be one of the means of bringing Germany down on its knees.”8 In Untermyer’s words, the aim of his “purely defensive economic boycott” was to “undermine the Hitler regime and bring the German people to their senses by destroying their export trade on which their very existence depends.”9 Tolerance of their “very existence” might be resumed once they clearly signalled their compliance. At least as early as May 1933, while Soviet collectivisation killed millions, Untermyer declared that Hitler’s government was carrying out a “cruel campaign of extermination”. His accusations were repeated in private correspondence as well as in speeches, newspaper articles and open letters. He specified in 1934 that not mere expulsion from Germany but the death of all Jews “by murder, suicide or starvation” was Hitler’s “openly avowed official policy and boasted purpose”. To the suggestion of verifying whereof he spoke, Untermyer replied “I have no intention of going to see Hitler, although asked by his friends to do so.”10 Churchill similarly spoke only about Hitler, never to him. Untermyer happily visited the Soviet Union during the Great Terror; Churchill did so in secret during the war.

In Britain, a boycott of trade with German firms was begun in the East End of London by Jews descended of immigrants from the Russian Empire. Though intimidation was employed to some effect, this effort alone could not force the hand of the whole British population. Regime change could more likely be achieved by compelling nation-states to act against Germany regardless of popular wishes, and of that aim Untermyer’s international campaign stood a better chance. He first launched the American League for the Defense of Jewish Rights, but was persuaded later in 1933 to change the name to the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights in order to attract non-Jewish support. According to Richard Hawkins, “In early November 1934, the NALCHR announced that a world conference would begin on November 25 in London. Its aim was to intensify and coordinate the boycott of Germany.” As Hawkins describes, the World Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council to Champion Human Rights (WNSANCHR) was established as a result.

“The conference also resulted in the establishment of a British Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council (BNSANC) with Sir Walter Citrine, the general secretary of the British Trades Union Congress, as president… The activities of the BNSANC appear to have gone largely unreported apart from a successful demonstration of as many as twenty thousand and a meeting in London’s Hyde Park joined by many thousands more on October 27, 1935. It was addressed by prominent British politicians and academics from across the political spectrum including Eleanor Rathbone MP, Clement Attlee MP… Citrine, Professor JBS Haldane and Sylvia Pankhurst.”

Hawkins must imagine the political spectrum to run only from socialists to communists, but anyway the Council would soon become remarkably non-sectarian in that regard. Though he says they went largely unreported, Hawkins himself mentions that the state-controlled BBC broadcast the Council’s addresses.11

The burgeoning influence, assisted by the BBC, of socialists like Attlee and Haldane caused dread to British conservatives including Harold Harmsworth, the first Viscount Rothermere, who owned newspapers including the popular Daily Mail and who had opposed universal suffrage and the growth of the Labour Party.12 Rothermere supported revision of the treaties imposed on Germany and the other defeated states after the Great War. He was also sympathetic to Benito Mussolini’s fascists and Hitler’s national socialists for their fierce opposition to the many attempts at communist revolution in Italy and Germany. In January 1934, he began supporting the British Union of Fascists in Mail editorials. Rothermere was particularly alarmed at Stafford Cripps’ communist-friendly Socialist League, which campaigned for Labour’s next government to grant itself the power to rule by decree and prohibit all opposition.13 With the Socialist League intact and growing, Rothermere nevertheless ceased to support the BUF in July 1934. According to Paul Briscoe, “Jewish directors of Unilever… decided to present… Lord Rothermere, with an ultimatum: if he did not stop backing Mosley, they and their friends would stop placing advertisements in his papers. Rothermere gave in.”14 In November 1933, Untermyer had written that “A properly carried out boycott will cause Germany´s economic collapse within a year.” Shortly after, Pinchas Horowitz, a prominent member of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, wrote that “Once the sixteen million Jews inhabiting the world stop buying German goods, they will represent a power which no country will be able to ignore.”15 Presumably, as Jews were relatively small in number and spread across many countries, neither Untermyer nor Horowitz seriously estimated their power as consumers so highly; the power which no country would be able to ignore more likely referred to the ability to coerce pezzonovantes like Rothermere to help ensure that Britain and other powerful states would prioritise international Jewish interests over those of their own people. Mosley, who strove to prevent war, would never have been anything other than a hindrance to “causing Germany’s economic collapse”.

Pinchas Horowitz was also a leading member of the Jewish Representative Council for the Boycott of German Goods and Services (JRC), founded in November 1933. The JRC was separate from the BoD though they had much commonality in membership. Neville Laski, the Board’s president, refused the JRC’s demands to involve his organisation officially in the Jewish boycott, arguing that such a move would likely provoke Hitler’s government to take repressive measures against Jews in Germany.16 This was consistent with the cautious stance taken by the German equivalent of the Board, the Central Association of German Citizens of Jewish Faith.17 Whatever Untermyer said about “terminating Jewish persecution”, he and associates like Rabbi Stephen Wise led the faction prepared to aggravate such persecution in pursuit of “overthrowing Hitler”. As Zionists, they likely found provocations of Hitler desirable. Certainly Untermyer seemed to regard his Jewish opponents in America with contempt, saying in December 1937:

“The wave of world-wide anti-Semitism, led and encouraged by Germany, that is inundating our country should serve only to make us more race conscious, tie us closer together and confirm us in our determination to combat and overcome by every means in our power the vast propaganda of this world-bully and braggart and the forces of evil that inspire it. There are still too many turn-coats, hyphenated Jews and apostates in our ranks. The sooner we expose them and rout them out, the better it will be for our welfare and self-respect. They are an undiluted liability.”18

Neville Laski’s reticence toward the overt participation of the Board of Deputies in Untermyer’s boycott also derived from the value he placed on the Board’s close relations with the British government and civil service. The historians who have written on the boycott mostly treat as a failure or a mistake the Board’s declining to join officially (though individual members were free to participate), but good relations with the likes of Robert Vansittart, the acutely anti-German head of the Foreign Office, were arguably more valuable. According to Laski, at a meeting in October 1934, Vansittart, referring to Untermyer and the American Jewish Congress (AJC), said that

“the aggressively Jewish, flamboyant and narrow character of the anti-German propaganda carried on by certain Jewish quarters in America was having results which were very nearly provocation of anti-semitism on a large scale… He said that he approved of the use of an economic weapon against Germany, but he did not approve of a flamboyant user of such a weapon.”19

Vansittart thus advised his allies on public relations, the better to achieve their shared aims. In 1936, as the World Jewish Congress was being founded (mainly by AJC members at first) with aims including “to coordinate the global economic boycott of Germany”, Laski, “who had originally been just cautious, changed his opinion within a single month towards a complete refusal and did his best to prevent participation in the WJC.” According to Vydra, the prevailing view among the Board of Deputies was that “the Congress would strengthen the boycott movement, but the BoD´s participation would lead to the loss of influence on the British government.”20 Most historians are militantly incurious about how the Board, representing less than half a percent of the British population, came to have such influence.

Jewish domestic policy

Vydra remarks that “[t]he Jewish boycott of Germany was an international activity and can be understood as a type of Jewish foreign policy.”21 Gentile foreign policy was found wanting. Intercession (stadlanut) had been enacted by the Russo-Jewish Committee and Lord Rothschild since the 1880s. The Jewish elite in Britain had also founded the Conjoint Committee for such work. While men like Vansittart and Churchill worked to align British foreign policy with “Jewish foreign policy”, their colleagues did likewise in domestic matters, virtually without resistance. The British Union of Fascists, however unsuited to the role, appears to have been the only vehicle of any size for opposing the usurpation, and thus was targeted for violent suppression. On 4th October 1936, the BUF staged a lawful, police-escorted demonstration through several sites in East London, an area in which Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe had concentrated, in which the unofficial, militant boycott of Germany had begun and in which British people were confronted by immigrant hostility exemplified by the violent crime operation led by Jacob Comacho (alias Jack Comer or Spot). As the police escort attempted to clear illegal blockades in Aldgate, they were assaulted by masses of armed Jews, Irish and communists. Comacho and his associates were leading figures in the assault. Jews organised under the Jewish People’s Council Against Fascism and Anti-Semitism. The communists were mainly from the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), which took orders from the Soviet Union via the Comintern. The ‘Battle of Cable Street’ was the largest of many such assaults on the BUF in the 1930s. The aggressors were rewarded with legislation within two months: a new Public Order Act which impaired the BUF’s ability to demonstrate.22

The Board of Deputies did not at first openly encourage anti-fascist aggression. As Daniel Tilles says, “much of the Board’s anti-fascist activity, for… good reason, took place privately and remained unpublicised.”23 In July 1936, a deputation from the Board, including Neville Laski and vice-president Robert Waley Cohen, expressed sympathy for Jewish violence against the BUF and prevailed on Simon to punish “those preaching hatred”.24 John Simon’s Act, passed in December that year, was “influenced by the personal intervention of Harold Laski” (Neville’s pro-Soviet brother) and “made the police act with even greater intensity” against the BUF.25 Let us assume that the hatred preached was so abominable as to justify bricks flung at British bobbies by gangsters, else we risk the conclusion that the deputies sought special treatment and power for the higher grade race.

The Board had begun to co-opt anti-fascist militancy before the assault in Aldgate, “establishing a body to direct defence policy in mid-1936, the Co-ordinating Committee (CoC – known from late 1938 as the Jewish Defence Committee).”26 Late in that year, “Sidney Salomon, the secretary of the CoC, in an interview with the Evening Standard, absolved his thugs of blame for their aggression, arguing that it was ‘not human nature… to stand calmly by while Blackshirts shout insults.’”27 Herbert Morrison, leader of the London County Council and a senior figure in the Labour Party, which affected to exist for the benefit of British workers, met in secret with Neville Laski and Harry Pollitt, leader of the CPGB, in October 1936 to co-ordinate the terrorism they mutually supported.28 By March 1937, Neville Laski was satisfied that condoning violence would not lose him politicians’ support: “in contact with the Home Office to discuss anti-Jewish meetings, [Laski warned] that ‘any self-respecting Jew in the crowd would have the greatest difficulty in restraining himself, not only vocally, but even physically.’” He also urged police to collaborate with Jewish and communist infiltrators or invaders starting fights at BUF meetings.29 Newsreel producers already routinely used misleadingly-edited footage of such fights to portray the BUF to the nation as the instigators.

Spreading dread

With the most avid opponents of hostility to Germany corralled by state suppression and terrorism, successive British governments, notwithstanding their Home Secretaries, remained an obstacle to the full adoption of “Jewish foreign policy”. Under MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin, peace with Germany continued, and Neville Chamberlain intended the same. Winston Churchill followed his aspersions about “war spirit” and “blood lust” with a fear campaign about Germany’s military strength. “As 1934 progressed Churchill developed an important subsidiary theme to disarmament: the growth of German air power”, according to David Irving, who continues:

“‘I dread the day,’ he told the House on March 8, ‘when the means of threatening the heart of the British empire should pass into the hands of the present rulers of Germany.’ Such melodramatic statements were typical of the debating stance that Churchill would adopt over the next five years. Sir John Simon predicted in cabinet on March 19 that Hitler would move east or into territories of German affinity like Austria, Danzig and Memel. His colleagues were unconvinced that Hitler harboured evil designs on the empire, and rightly so. We now know from the German archives that even his most secret plans were laid solely against the east. In August 1936 he would formulate his Four Year Plan to gird Germany for war against Bolshevist Russia; and not until early 1938 did he order that Germany must consider after all the contingency of war with Britain – a contingency which, it must be said, Mr Churchill had himself largely created by his speeches.”30

Churchill “found that Britain’s weakness in the air was a popular theme, particularly among leading London businessmen. Their doyen Sir Stanley Machin invited him to address the City Carlton Club on it. He developed his campaign on the floor of the House, in newspaper and magazine articles, and in BBC broadcasts too.”31

Churchill used Parliamentary privilege and his high security clearance to publicise statistics, and alarming interpretations of them, on behalf of a network of anti-German civil servants and intelligence agents led by Robert Vansittart, head of the Foreign Office. On 9th November 1933, the Committee of Imperial Defence had “decided that a body should be set up to determine Britain’s worst defence deficiencies. That body, which became the DRC, was approved by the Cabinet on 15 November” but “held its first meeting on 14 November, the day before it was formally constituted by the Cabinet.”32 The Defence Requirements Committee was “the body whose decisions largely determined the path that British strategic defence policy took in the years until 1939.”33 It was a vehicle for Vansittart and Warren Fisher, his equivalent at the Treasury, to wage institutional war against the Air Ministry which was “[i]n theory… the sole body responsible for the co-ordination and analysis of information on the German air force” and which insisted on reporting what it found.34 As Wesley Wark describes,

“Despite the fact that no concrete intelligence had reached the air ministry during the DRC’s term, the committee nevertheless found itself preoccupied by the question of the future rearmament of Germany, especially in the air. Pushed by Vansittart, the DRC accepted, without conviction, the estimate of five years as the time it would take Germany to rearm, and adopted this as their deadline for British defence planning. Germany was fixed, using Warren Fisher’s terminology, as the ‘ultimate potential enemy’. When the chief of the air staff presented a very modest programme for the RAF to the committee, both Vansittart and Fisher threatened that they would not sign the report.”35

The moderation of the air staff provoked Vansittart to bypass them. “The clash of political and military intelligence in the DRC had encouraged the central department of the Foreign Office to begin drawing up their own appreciations of the German air force.”36 Ralph Wigram, the head of that department, supplied Churchill figures until his death in 1936.37 Another supplier was Desmond Morton, formerly of the Secret Intelligence Service and in 1934 the head of the Industrial Intelligence Centre of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Morton brought to Churchill’s home “secret files which the Prof. [Frederick Lindemann] illicitly photocopied for Churchill.” Morton’s figures only spoke of numbers of planes and “omitted any consideration of quality or range”.38 Churchill’s rhetoric aimed at maximising alarm: “‘Germany has already, in violation of the Treaty, created a military airforce which is now nearly two-thirds as strong as our present home defence airforce.’ By the end of 1935, he warned, Hitler would match Britain’s airforce; by 1936 he would overtake it – such was Churchill’s claim.” Irving paraphrases Churchill: “[I]f both countries continued to rearm at their present rate, in 1937 Germany would have twice the airforce Britain had.” He continues:

“It is plain from the record of November 25th that the cabinet was concerned about the effect of Mr Churchill’s brash campaign on their delicate relations with Germany. Hoare felt they must make clear to the world that his ‘charges were exaggerated.’ Chamberlain expressed puzzlement that they themselves had no information backing Churchill’s claims… [T]he captured files of the German air ministry reveal both his statistics and his strategic predictions to have been wild, irresponsible, exaggerated scaremongering, delivered without regard for the possible consequences on international relations.”39 

Vansittart was aided by Reginald Leeper who became head of the Foreign Office news department in 1935. According to Richard Cockett, “Leeper shared the views of Sir Robert Vansittart on foreign policy and in particular his attitude to Germany.”40 Leeper sought “willing collaborator[s]” among journalists

“to further the aims and policies of the Foreign Office. He realized that with a certain degree of openness and flattery diplomatic correspondents could be welded into a cohesive body who could be relied upon always to put the Foreign Office point of view in the press. [He] built up a set of diplomatic correspondents… loyal to him.”41

The main enticement for correspondents was being shown confidential Foreign Office documents. “[T]he more correspondents were let into the News Department’s confidence, the more willing they would be to adopt the Foreign Office view.” Leeper’s “tame pets” repeated the Foreign Office’s views under their own names.42 At least one of the “most privileged diplomatic correspondents”, Norman Ewer of the Daily Herald, was a spy for the Soviet Union.43

In March 1935, Vansittart leaked the fact that Hitler had privately claimed to John Simon that his Luftwaffe, forbidden under Versailles, had already reached parity with the Royal Air Force.44 Leeper then fed out a more alarming story in April, and Churchill spoke of it as “official” in Parliament.45

Leeper’s team overlapped with Vansittart’s. According to Cockett,

“They used the News Department to give out news of conditions in Germany, statistics of German rearmament, reports of German concentration camps to enhance this pessimistic view of Germany – the leak to the Daily Telegraph in 1935 was supposed to contribute to this general picture. Vansittart was particularly free with his confidences and encouraged Leeper to take the same attitude in the pursuance of their campaign against appeasement. Ian Colvin relates how ‘Rex Leeper sometimes came upon Vansittart in his room at the FO in full conversation with Winston Churchill.’ The excuse Vansittart gave to Leeper for communicating confidential information to a mere MP was that ‘it is so important that a man of Churchill’s influence should be properly informed’ and so he was quite content to ‘tell him whatever I know’.”46

  1. Churchill’s War, David Irving, 2003, p18, 23 ↩︎
  2. Irving, p36 ↩︎
  3. Irving, p37 ↩︎
  4. According to David Irving, Churchill’s opponents “regarded the relentless assault on Ramsay MacDonald and his quest for disarmament as prompted by selfish political motives. But it was easy to contrast Macdonald’s tireless efforts with Hitler’s stealthy rearmament. It made good copy.” Irving, p37 ↩︎
  5. Irving, p23 ↩︎
  6. Stalin’s War of Extermination, Joachim Hoffman, 2001, p30, 32 ↩︎
  7. Daily Express, March 24th 1933, reproduced at The Daily Express was the largest-circulation newspaper in the world at the time. Max Aitken (Lord Beaverbrook), the proprietor and an old friend of Churchill, became a minister in Churchill’s wartime government. ↩︎
  8. British Jewry and the Attempted Boycott of Nazi Germany, 1933–1939, Zbyněk Vydra, Theatrum historiae 21 (2017), p206 ↩︎
  9. “Hitler’s Bitterest Foe”: Samuel Untermyer and the Boycott of Nazi Germany, 1933–1938, Richard Hawkins, American Jewish History, Volume 93, Number 1, March 2007, p31 ↩︎
  10. Hawkins, p25, 26, 29, 30. Given Untermyer’s wild accusations, it is rational to wonder how often similar statements from others are uttered regardless of evidence. ↩︎
  11. Hawkins, p45. Irving says that “Citrine was angered by Hitler’s brutal closure of the trade unions.” Irving, p59. Stalin must have closed his unions less brutally. ↩︎
  12. See Labour and the Gulag – Russia and the Seduction of the British Left by Giles Udy, 2017. Much of the Labour Party, including Ramsey MacDonald, was pro-Soviet from 1917 to 1945. During the Cold War this became a fringe position in the party. ↩︎
  13. The Impact of Hitler, Maurice Cowling, 1975, p46 ↩︎
  14. My Friend the Enemy : an English Boy in Nazi Germany, Paul Briscoe, 2008, p28. According to James Pool, Rothermere confirmed this to Mosley and Hitler. See Who Financed Hitler: The Secret Funding of Hitler’s Rise to Power, 1919-1933, James Pool, 1997, p315-6 ↩︎
  15. Vydra, p206 ↩︎
  16. Vydra, p200 ↩︎
  17. Final Solution: The Fate of the Jews 1933–1949, David Cesarani, 2016, part one, section ‘Protest and Boycott’. Cesarani notes that the American Jewish Committee originally took the same position as Laski’s Board of Deputies while the American Jewish Congress sided with Untermyer and helped form the World Jewish Congress. ↩︎
  18. Hawkins, p49. Vilification was used in support of the boycott from the start. ↩︎
  19. Anglo-Jewish Responses to Nazi Germany 1933-39: The Anti-Nazi Boycott and the Board of Deputies of British Jews, Sharon Gewirtz, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 26, Number 2, April 1991, p267 ↩︎
  20. Vydra, p211 ↩︎
  21. Vydra, p212 ↩︎
  22. – note the approval of the authors. The Act was the creation of John Simon, who as Home Secretary had ultimate authority over all British police, including those wounded trying to uphold the law in Aldgate. ↩︎
  23. “Some lesser known aspects” – The Anti-Fascist Campaign of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, 1936-40, Daniel Tilles, p138 ↩︎
  24. Tilles, p139 ↩︎
  25. Vydra, p212 ↩︎
  26. Tilles, p136. “Over 1937 the CoC established the London Area Council (LAC), a subsidiary body in the East End that took over the anti-fascist campaigning of the Association of Jewish Friendly Societies (AJFS), which had already been working in harmony with the Board.” Tilles, p143 ↩︎
  27. Tilles, p140 ↩︎
  28. Tilles, p151. Morrison and the Board of Deputies were already linked by their collaboration on the Anti-Nazi Council, of which Pinchas Horowitz was a member and Morrison was a vice-president. Irving, Churchill’s War, volume 1, chapter 6, note 4 ↩︎
  29. Tilles, p140 ↩︎
  30. Irving, p40 ↩︎
  31. Irving, p40 ↩︎
  32. The Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, British Strategic Foreign Policy, Neville Chamberlain and the Path to Appeasement, Keith Neilson, The English Historical Review, Volume 118, Number 477, June 2003, p662, 665 ↩︎
  33. Neilson, p653 ↩︎
  34. British Intelligence on the German Air Force and Aircraft Industry, 1933–1939, Wesley Wark, The Historical Journal, Volume 25, Issue 03, September 1982, p628 ↩︎
  35. Wark, p630. The reasons for fixing Germany as the enemy are unmentioned; Wark simply calls it “obvious”. ↩︎
  36. Wark, p631 ↩︎
  37. Irving, p48 ↩︎
  38. Irving, p40-1. “There is no evidence to support the latter’s postwar claim that Morton did so with prime ministerial approval; other papers were just filched by Morton and never returned.” ↩︎
  39. Irving, p41-2. Simon, Hoare and Chamberlain were among those termed the Guilty Men in 1940 in a book published by the Jewish communist Victor Gollancz. ↩︎
  40. Twilight of Truth – Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press, Richard Cockett, 1989, p21 ↩︎
  41. Cockett, p16-7 ↩︎
  42. Cockett, p21 ↩︎
  43. Cockett, p17-8 ↩︎
  44. Cockett, p20 ↩︎
  45. Cockett, p21 ↩︎
  46. Cockett, p22 ↩︎
Series Navigation<< Debt, Warmongering and JudeophiliaChampions of Judea | Part 2 >>

Post Author

Leave a comment

0 0 votes
Article Rating
Notify of
Inline Feedbacks
View all comments
Would love your thoughts, please comment.x